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FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE  EXPECTATIONS: 
MICRO SURVEY DATA 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  analyzes the  panel  data  of  bi—weekly  surveys, 
conducted  by the Japan Center for International  Finance,  on  the 
yen/dollar exchange rate expectations  of forty—four  institutions 
for  two  years.  There are three major findings in  this  paper. 
First,  market participants  are found to be heterogeneous.  There 
are  significant  "individual  effects"  in  their  expectation 
formation.  Second,  many institutions  are found to  violate  the 
rational  expectation  hypothesis.  Third,  forecasts  with  long 
horizons  showed  less  yen appreciation  than  those  with  short 
horizons.  Cross-equation  constraints implied  by the  consistency 
of the forecast  term structure  are strongly  rejected in the  data. 
Takatoshi Ito 
Institute of Economic Research 
1-Jitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186 Japan 1.  Introduction 
As  rational  expectations  have become  a popular  benchmark  in  thinkctng 
financial  and  macroeconomic  hypotheses,  many economists  have  become  more 
interested  in  directly  measuring  expectations of  market  participants. 
Although  survey  data on many domestic  variables,  including  interest  rates 
and  inflation  rates,  have been frequently  analyzed  by  many  investigators 
(see,  for example.  Miahkin  (1983;  ch. 4)).  it is only recently  that  survey 
data  on  foreign  exchange  rates  have become  available  and  been  analyzed. 
Dominguez  (1986) and Frankel  and Froot  (1987a.b)  have exploited  the  survey 
data  made available  by the Money  Market  Service  (MMS).  the Amex Bank  Review 
and the  Economist  Financial  Report.1 
The  surveys  that  were investigated  by Dominguez.  and by  Frankel  and 
Froot  have only their  median  responses  reported.  Heterogeneity among  the 
market  participants,  if  it existed,  is aggregated  out.  If  the  market 
consists  of homogeneous  agents  which share  the  same forecasting  model  with 
common  belief  (priors)  and information,  then  the  median  response  would 
sufficiently  describe the market in  terms  of forecasts.  However,  if  market 
participants differ  in their  forecasting  characteristics,  focusing  on  the 
median  misses  the most interesting  questions  such as whehter  the differences 
persist  or  are temporary,  whether  the difference  is  correlated with  the 
participant's  traits,  and whether a rationality  hypothesis  is more Likely to 
be  rejected in individual  data.  Only individual  responses  of  survey  data 
could  answer these  questions. 
In this paper,  I will use the survey  data collected  by  the Japan Center 
for  International  Finance  (JCIF)  in Tokyo, which allows  me  to  investigate 
the  individual  responses  in the survey.2  In particular  the JCIF  data  set 
has  two  distinct  advantages  over  other  data used  by  Dominguem,  and  by 
-1- Frankel  and  Froot.  First,  the JCIF data consist  of  individual  responses 
with  no missing  observations.  Second.  not only  financial  institutions  but 
other  companies  are  polled in the JCIF survey.  Therefore,  there  is  a 
chance to associate  possible  heterogeneity  to forecasters'  industry  traits. 
There  are  three  major  findings  in  this  paper.  First,  market 
participants  are  found  to  be  heterogeneous.  There  are  significant 
"individual  effects"  in  their  expectation formation.  Second,  many 
institutions  ace found  to violate  the rational  expectation  hypothesis.  Most 
of  them  underestimated  the degree  of yen appreciation.  Third,  forecasts 
with  long  horizons  showed  less  yen appreciation  than  ones  with  short 
horizons.  Put differently,  market  participants  appear to have a  "bandwagon" 
expectation  in the short-run,  but a "stabilizing"  one in the long-run.  The 
"twist"  in forecast  term structure  could be "internally  consistent"  (in  the 
sense  of Froot  and Ito (1988)),  if an iterated  substitution  of a  short-term 
forecast  yields  a long-term  forecast,  However,  cross-equation constraints 
implied  by the internal  consistency  are strongly  rejected  in the data, 
2.  Data Summary 
2.A.  The Data  Description 
- 
The  JCIF  has  conducted  a telephone  survey  twice  a month, in the  middle 
and  the end of the month,  on Wednesdays,  since  May 1985.  Forecasts  of  the 
yen/dollar  exchange  rate  for  one-,  three-  and  six-month  horizons  are 
obtained  from  foreign exchange  experts  in 44  companies;  15  banks  and 
brokers,  4  securities  companies,  6 trading  companies.  9  export-oriented 
companies S life insurance  companies,  and 5 import-oriented  industries,4  The 
survey It is meticulously  arranged  so that all 44 companies  on the permanent 
list respond  every  week, 
-2- ihen  a data set is analyzed  as a panel  data,  the mean  across  rndivi- 
duals  and the mean across  time should  not be confused.  :n  the  following, 
the  mean across  forty-four  individuals  at a time wrll be referred  to as  an 
(cross-section.  total)  average:  the mean across  individuals  at a time  in  an 
industry  group  will be referred  to as a group average.  The mean  across time 
of an individual,  of a group, or of the total  "average"  will be referred  to 
as  the  (time)  mean of the individual,  of the group.  or  of  the  avetage, 
respectively. 
The JCIF calculates  the total  average,  standard  deviation,  maximum,  and 
minimum  of forty-four  responses  and also industry  group  averages  and  group 
standard  deviations.  On the day after  che survey,  the  ICIF  informs  ita 
members,  including  those  who are polled,  of the summary  statistics.  The 
overall  (cross-section)  average  is also released  to the  press  and  other 
media. 
I  will use,  in addition  to the panel data of forty-four  companies,  the 
public  information  part of the survey:  the cross-section  average  (AyE)  of 
forty-four  companies  and group  averages  for  different  industries:  banks 
(BAN),  securities  companies (SEC)  trading  companies  [Sogo  Shosha]  (TRA), 
companies  in  the export  industries  (EXP),  insurance  companies  (INS),  and 
companies  in  the  import  industries  (IMP).  The unit is yen per  one  U.S. 
dollar,  so that negative  movement  indicates  yen "appreciation."  The  spot 
exchange  rate,  s(t),  is measured  at the closing  quote  in Tokyo  on  Wednesday 
of the  survey  week. 
2.B  Overview 
Let us illustrate  the average  (aggregate)  expectation  and the  movement 
of actual  exchange rates  during  the one-year  turbulent  period  following  the 
Oroup  of Five,  Plaza  Agreement  of September  1985.  In Figure  1,  the  solid 
-3- line  is the actual  daily spot  rate,  while  the base of each sequence  of three 
arrows shows  the timing  of the poll and the spot exchange rate of that  day. 
Three  arrows,  respectively,  point to the forecasted  exchange  rate  (the 
average  of  the forty four)  with the one-.  thpee-  and  six-month  horizons. 
Therefore,  the vertical  deviation  of  the tip of an arrow  from the spot  rate 
(solid) line represents  an ex  mistake  of the expectation. 
FIGURE  1  ABOUT  HERE 
From  this figure,  two preliminary  observations  emerge.  First,  each  of 
several  waves  of aharp  appreciation  does not seem to have  been  anticipated 
by  the  market,  (See  Ito (1987) for "news" analyeia  of  these  appreciation 
waves,)  Second,  the long-run  expectation  is not the simple  extrapolation  of 
the  short-run  expectations.  In  fact,  there  seems  to  be  a  "twist"  in 
expectation  term structure, 
In  order  to quantify  these  observations  and to extend  observations to 
group  aggregates and  individual  reaponaea,  Table  1  and  Figure  2  are 
provided.  Table  1 shows  that the time  means  of  (unconditional)  expected 
changes  (in percent) from  the spot rate  at the, time of survey  for the cross- 
section  total  average,  group  averages,  and (in  a  separate  distribution 
table)  for  each individual.  For the purpose  of discussion,  the  mean  of 
forward premium  (FOR) and the actual  (ex  Q9,f)  changes of the spot  exchange 
rate  (ACT)  for  each horizon  are reported  in  the  same  table.  For  each 
horizon  and each individual  or group,  subtracting  the forward premium  from 
the  forecasts  yields  the implied risk  premium  and subtracting the  actual 
changes  produces  the forecast  errors, 
TABLE 1 and FIGURE  2  about  here 
-4- In  the  one-month  horizon,  the  (total) average  on  a  typical  week 
expected  a 1.4 percent  yen appreciation.  The group  averages ranged from 0.8 
percent  to 2 percent  appreciation.  In relative  to total  average,  the export 
industry  was most biased  toward  yen depreciation  and trading  companies  and 
import  industries  were  most biased  toward  yen appreciation.  Looking  into 
individual  data,  one extreme  predicted  1.4 percent  depreciation of  yen. 
while  the  other  extreme  predicted  3.1 percent  of appreciation.  The  distri- 
bution  of individual  forecasts  has a nice unimodal  distribution.  The actual 
change  is at about one-fifth  in the distribution,  that  is. about  20  percent 
of participants  overpredicted  rhe size of yen appreciation  in the  one-month 
horizon. 
The  mean  of forward  premium  (FOR) was  0.15 percent.  indicating  that 
there  was a risk premium  for most of the participants  in favor  of the dollar 
asset.  The mean of actual  changes  for a one-month  period  was  2.1  percent 
during  the  two  years  of the sample  period.  The  forecasts  by  trading 
companies  with 2.0 percent and import  companies  with 1.9 percent  came  close 
to the actual movement.  All groups  and a majority of individuals  did better 
in forecasting  than the forward  rate in the one-month  horizon. 
The expected appreciation  of the yen in the three-month  horizon  for the 
average  was  1.4 percent,  about  the same as the one-month  horizon.  (Note 
that  no adjustment  is made with respect  to the length  of  horizon.)  Hence, 
the aggregate  forecasts,  one-month  and three-month  combined,  imply  that they 
predict  little  movement  after the first month to the third  month  in  the 
forecast  horizon.  However,  this statement  will be qualified  shortly  when we 
examine  the individual  responses.  The actual change  was 6  percent  appre- 
ciation  in three  months.  The total  and group  averages  underpredicted the 
size of yen appreciation  by 3  to 5 percentage  points.  In fact,  the most yen 
-5- appreciation predicted  by an individual  is 4.3 percent.  and  no  individual 
overpredicted  the size  of yen appreciation  in the  three-month  horizon. 
As in the one-month  horizon,  the export industry  has a yen depreciation 
bias  (from  the  total  average),  and the  trading  companies  have  a  yen 
appreciation bias  in  the  three-month  horizon.  The  implied  risk  premium 
shows  that the export  industry  would  have a negative  risk premium  for  the 
dollar  asset, while others  have a positive  risk  premium  as in the  one-month 
horizon.  This  makes sense  considering  that exporters  are long  in  dollar 
assets in the medium run. 
Wide  disagreement  among individuals  starts  to show in the  three-month 
forecasts.  It becomes  a bi-mod.al distribution:  one group  believes that the 
yen  depreciates  from the one-month  to three-month  in the forecast  horizon. 
while the other  believes that the yen continues  to  appreciate.  The  distri- 
bution also  has long tails.  Therefore,  although  the group averages  for one- 
and  three-month  horizons predict  a yen appreciation  of about the same  size 
(1.4  percent).  distributions  of individual  responses  are  quite  different. 
The last observation  illustrates  how important  it is to have a data set with 
individual  responses  rather  than one with the summary  statistics. 
For the six-month  horizon,  the total  average  practically  shows  that the 
market  expects  the yen to return  to the prevailing  level  at  the  time  of 
forecast.  This is a sharp turnaround  from  the forecast of 1.4 percent  yen 
appreciation  in three  months.  In  fact,  each  of the group averages  indicates 
that  the group  anticipates  less yen appreciation  in the  six-month  horizon 
than  either  of  the one- or three-month horizons.  The  agreement  among 
different  groups in forecasting  the sharp  yen appreciation  from the third  to 
the  sixth  month is quite striking,  since  they differ  in  forecasting the 
-6- direction  of the yen from the firsr to the third  month. 
In  the  six-month  horizon, all of the groups  have  a  negative  risk 
premium  for the dollar  denominated  asset.  This contrasts to  the  positive 
risk premium  in the one-month  horizon. 
The distribution  of individuals  is almost  uniform ranging from  a  three 
percent  depreciation  to a one percent  appreciation.  highlighting  a diversity 
of the  individual  forecasts.  It is clear  from the figure  that the degree  of 
diversity  increases  as the forecast  horizon  is longer.  Again  looking  at the 
average  would  not give this observation. 
Findings  of this section can be aummarized  and related  to the  contents 
of  the  rest of this paper.  First,  the findings  are highly  suggestive  of 
heterogeneous  market participants.  A rigorous  analysis  and interpretation  of 
the  heterogeneity  will be provided  in Section  3.  Second,  large  forecast 
errors  were recorded  during the intermittent  waves of yen appreciation  after 
September  1985.  However,  when the exchange  rate  was relatively  stable for a 
while,  the  one-month  market  expectation overpredicted the  amount  of 
appreciation.  Therefore,  it  is not immediately  clear  from  the  figures 
whether  expectations  were unbiased.  In  Table  1, a comparison  of group  (or 
individual)  time  means  with the actual change  (ACT)  shows  the  average 
forecast  errors for each horizon.  These  observations  are  only  suggestive 
without  test statistics.  Econometric  tests  on varioua  forms  of the rational 
expectation  hypothesis  will be conducted  in Section  4. 
Third,  the short-horizon  expectations  seem to predict yen appreciation, 
while  the long-horizon  expectations  seem  to predict a reverse in  direction. 
Thus,  the  total  average and most of the group averages  have  a  "twist'  in 
their  forecasts,  Section  5  investigates  whether  such  twists  in 
expectations  are internally  consistent. 3.  Wishful  Expectations  and Heterogeneity 
3.A.  Econometric  Issue  -- a  special  case of  data 
Recall  that  our  micro  survey  data  set  consists  of  forty-four 
individuals  and fifty-one  observations.  Suppose  that an individual  forecast 
formation  at  time  t consists  of the common  structural  part  based  on  the 
public  information,  f(I(tY  and the individual  effect.  ej.  For  a  given 
forecast  horizon,  k (suppressed  notation),  the expected  exchange  rate  for 
individual  j, j  1  J  (where in this paper J=44)  is 
si(t)  f(I(t))  + ej ÷ uj(t)  (3.1) 
where si(t)  is a k-step  ahead  forecast  of the  spot exchange  rate at time t. 
by  individual  j:  u(t) is a pure  random  disturbance  representing.  for 
example,  a  measurement  error.  The cross-section  average  of  individual 
forecasts,  5XVE(t)  is defined  as 
5AVE(t)  f(I(t))  + cAVE + uAVE(t)  (32) 
where  5XVE(t)  (E s(t))/J,  cAVE  — (E  ej)/.J  and uAVE  (E  u1)/J.  Assume 
f(I(t))  contains  a  constant  term so that  normalization,  CAVE  —  0.  is 
possible.  Then subtracting  each side of (3.2)  from the corresponding  side of 
(3.1), we obtain 
s(t) 
-  5XVE(t)  — ej + (uj(t) 
-  uAvE(t))  (3.3) 
The  estimator  of individual  effect.  ej can be obtained  by  regressing the 
lefthand  side of (3.3)  on a constant  over the sample  period  (across  time). 
This  procedure  is  simple  and  robust.  It  is  unnecessary  for  the 
econometrician to know the exact  structure  f(I(t))  as long as it is  common 
-8- to everybody  for every survey  date. 
- 
If  the difference  in the individual  effects  of two tndividuals.is  to be 
estimated,  a similar  method  can be employed. 
s(t) 
- s(t)  ej-ek 
+ (u1(t 
- uk(t)).  k,'j.  (3.4) 
Then the difference  in the individual  effect  between  the individual  j and  k 
is  estimated  by regressing  the lefthand  side of (3.4) on a  constant  term 
over  the sample  period (across time). 
If  the  difference  in individual  beliefs  extends  to  'idiosyncratic" 
coefficients on  publicly  available  information  in  the  structural  part. 
f(I(t)),  the above  procedure  needs  to be  modified,  but  is still  applicable. 
Suppose,  for example,  that the forecast  is in an extrapolative  form: 
s(t)-sAVE(t) — a + bli(s(t-l)-s(t)) 
+ b2i(s(t-2)-s(t-l))  + uj(t)  (3,5) 
where ej is integrated  in the difference  in  aj. Then the  idiosyncratic  indi- 
vidual  coefficients  can be estimated  by regressing  the following  equations: 
s(t)-sVE(t) 
— aj-aAvE+  (blj-b1AVE)(s(t-l)-s(t)) 
+ (b2j-b2AVE)(s(t-2)-s(t-l)) 
+ uj(t)-uAVE  (3.6) 
The above procedure  parallels  the technique  in the panel  data  analysis, 
although,  in  the  usual  examples  of the panel  data  analysis,  the  common 
structure  has  the  different  input  amount  (such  as  labor  and  capital) 
observable  to  econometricians.  Instead,  it is reasonable  here  to  assume 
that  the  structural  part and values  of regressors  (i.e.,  past  values  of 
the  exchange  rates)  in  exchange  rate forecasts  are  identical  for  all 
individuals,  but  with possibly  different  coefficients.  This,  on  the  one 
hand,  simplifies  the estimation  of individual  effects,  but on  the other hand 
-9- makes  a time effect  impossible  to  detect.  Since the value  of  regressors. 
that is past exchange  rates,  are common  for all  individuals,  a cross-section 
regression  or other techniques  to detect  s time effect  cannot  be applied  in 
our panel  data. 
3..B  Heterogeneous  Participants  in the I2i  Market 
In search  of hard evidence for (or against)  heterogeneity  among  market 
participants,  I  estimate  forty-four  individual  effects,  ej and also  "group 
effects."  In  detecting  the  "group  effect,"  a  group  average  forecast 
calculated  by the .JCIF is treated  as an individual  j.  then the total  average 
(or another  group average) is subtracted.5 
The  individual  (or group)  effect  ej is estimated  using equation  (3.3) 
and  reported  in Table  2.  Panels  2.A.  and 2.8 show the group  effects,  and 
panel 2.C.  shows  the distribution  of individual  effects. 
Insert  Table  2  about here 
From  panel  2.A.  ,  we learn  that for any horizon,  group  effects  are 
significant  for the export  industry,  with  an depreciation  bias,  and for  the 
trading  companies,  with a appreciation  bias.  A  significant appreciation 
bias  was detected  also for the import  industry  for the  one-month  horizon, 
for the insurance  industry,  and for the banking  sector. 
The  distictive  effect  of exporters  in contrast to  importers  or  to 
trading  companies  can  be  highlighted by  measuring  the  difference  in 
individual effects  directly,  as in equation  (3.4).  This is done  in  panel 
2.8.  Again,  this confirms  that exporters  have depreciation  bias  in  their 
expectation  formation  in relation  to importers  and trading  companies  for any 
horizon. 
-  10  - Panel  2.C  shows  that, for any horizon,  about half of  the  forty-four 
individuals have  a significanr  bias  in their  forecasts.  Deviations are 
sometimes  very large.  One  individual  in the one-month  horizon  forecasted  on 
average  three  percent depreciated  than the average of the group.  Similarly. 
one  individual  forecasted  with a 5 percent  depreciation  bias in the  three- 
and six-month  horizons. 
One might object  to a formulation  of individual  effects  in the form  of 
biases  in the constant  term.  They could have different  models.  Since  it is 
not  likely  that  the  JCIF  or  the  econometrician could  persuade  each 
forecaster  to  justify  the forecast  with the model every  week,  we  have  to 
guess  the  form,  assuming  that  each  market  participant has  a  common 
autoregressive  forecasting  model, but with  different  coefficients  on the  lag 
terms  (possibly  because  of the difference  in  their  prior  belief),  As 
discussed  above,  idiosyncratic  coefficients  can be estimated  from  equation 
(3.6).  The results  are shown in Table  3. 
Insert  Table  3 about  here 
Table  3  once  again  shows  that  exporters  and  trading  companies  are 
significantly  heterogeneous for any of the  three  horizons.  However,  the 
difference  comes  from the bias in individual  (constant  term)  effects,  not 
from idiosyncratic  coefficients  of the lagged  variables.  Importers  for  the 
one-month  horizon  and the banks  for the six-month  horizon  also  show  the 
individual  (constant)  effect,  as  in table 2.A,  but  fail  to  show  the 
idiosyncratic  coefficients on  the  lagged  variables.  Therefore,  the 
heterogeneity  is more like a constant  bias rather  than the difference  in how 
to  react  to the recent  changes in the exchange  rate.  Table  2,  panels  A-C 
-  11  - and Table 3,  all combined,  show solid  evidence  for heterogeneous  expectation 
formations  among  market participants. 
3.C  Discussion:  Heterogeneity  and Rational  Expectations 
Most  of  the modern  theory  of finance  or  macroeconomics assumes  the 
existence  of  the representative  agent  whose  decision  is  an  aggregate  of 
market  participants.  In fact,  the hypothesis  of rational  expectations  would 
require  that market participants  be homogeneous  in their  formation  of expec- 
tations,  since  the true stochastic  process  is unique.  Therefore,  findings 
of  heterogeneity  in this section  cast some doubts  to the framework  using  a 
homogeneous  agent  model  commonly  used in finance and  macroeconomics. 
If  agents  have  private  information  which  econometricians do  not 
observe,  the existence  of individual  effects may not be  inconsistent with 
rational expectations.  However,  important  news and variables  in the foreign 
exchange  market  are  mostly  common  knowledge.  A  likely  explanation of 
heterogeneity,  consistent  with rational  expectations,  would be slow learning 
process  due to a strong  biased  prior.  Then,  we need to consider  how  biases 
may be related  to individual  priors. 
3.D Discussion:  Wishful Expectations 
Having  established  heterogeneity,  a discussion  of why  certain  market 
participants have  depreciation  or appreciation  biases  is in  order.  From 
Table  2.A and 2.B,  we notice  some regularity  in the group effects.  Market 
participants apparently  form "wishful  expectations." Exporters  wish  that 
the  yen  will depreciate  in the future,  enabling  their  profit  margins  to 
increase  and their products  to compete  better  in the foreign  markets.  Their 
responses  to survey  questions  seem  biased  toward  yen depreciation relative 
to  the average.  On the contrary,  importers'  responses  reflect  their  wish 
-  12  - for  stronger  yen  so that import  costs  will decrease.°  The  tendency  of 
wishful  expectations  is  evident in the one-month  ahead  forecasts.  The 
exporters  forecasts  show  a  continuing  deviation  from  the  mean, 
significantly biased  toward  yen depreciation.  as  the  forecast  horizon 
lengthens.  In  the  three-month  and six-month  ahead  prediction,  trading 
companies,  instead  of importers,  show a bias toward  appreciation. 
This  "wishful  expectation"  may be a reflection  of non-rational honest 
mistakes  in expectation  formation.  A straightforward  interpretation  would be 
for respondents  to mix wishful  thinking  with  objective  forecasts.  There are 
a few deeper explanations  of wishful  expectations. 
The  Japanese  manufacturing and  trading  companies  usually  set  an 
in-house  exchange  rate,  which can be used for  the  sales  department  in 
calculating in-house  accounting.  It is possible  that  these  in-house  rates 
are  heterogeneous,  and  moreover  are slightly  biased  so  that  the  sales 
department  is encouraged.  The survey  responses  from  these companies  may  be 
influenced  by the biased  in-house  exchange  rate,  although the respondent  is 
not from  the sales department. 
If  the  announcement of the JCIF  survey  is very  influential  on  the 
market,  the  respondent  may be induced to try  manipulating  the  announced 
survey  result  by answering  with biased  forecasts.  Exporters  respond to  the 
JCIF  by announcing  the rate depreciated,  though  slightly  to  avoid  obvious 
detection,  in  the hope that the survey  mean is biased  toward  depreciation. 
Exporters  hope that the mean expectation  with an "unexpected"  depreciating 
bias  cause  others  to start  selling  yen,  thus  creating  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy;  if  importers  understand  that exporters  have incentives to  lie. 
then  importers  would counter  by manipulating  their  announcements;  and  vice 
-  13  - versa.  Thus,  as a Nash equilibrium,  the mean  may not be biased  after  all. 
although  exporters  and importers  are  biased. 
Despite  its  appeal  to economists  who are  trained  to  seriously  think 
about  expectation  and manipulation,  this  story  of a manipulative  motive  has 
a  few  shortcomings.  First,  the  size  of  survey.  i.e.  .  forty-four 
respondents,  is  large  enough  that  a  manipulation by  one  respondent 
insignificant  unless  the bias is large  enough  to be detected easily  by  the 
JCIF.  If  all  exporters  tollude  in their  responses.  it  may  escape  easy 
detection.  But  the identity  of respondents  included  in  the  survey  is  a 
secret.  Second,  if  other  participants understand  that  exporters  and 
importers  have incentives  to lie,  then they  would not take the JOIF  survey 
seriously,  thereby removing  the incentive  to lie.  It may be the case  that 
market  participants  are simply  naive in forming  wishful  expectations. 
4.  Rationality  of Expectations 
In this  section,  I  will apply standard  tests  of rational  expectation  to 
this  survey  data.7  First,  if forecasts  are rational,  the  forecast  errors 
should  be  random.  In other  words, survey  forecasts  should  be  unbiased. 
Second,  given  rational  expectation,  forecast  errors  should  be  uncorrelated 
with any information  available  at the time the forecast  is  made.  Otherwise, 
the variable  correlated  with the ex post  error could  have been exploited  to 
make better  forecast.  Put differently,  forecast  errors  should  be orthogonal 
to any variable in  the information  set at the time of forecasting. 
Under  the null hypothesis  of rational  expectation,  the  realized  spot 
rate is the sum of a forecast  and a forecast  error: 
s(t+k) — 5e(k) 
- e(t,k)  (4.1) 
where  e(t,k)  is  mean  zero  forecast  errors  and  uncorrelated with  any 
14 variables  available  at t.  It is well  known  that forecast  errors.  e(t.k). 
would  be  serially correlated  if the forecast  horizon  is  longer  than  the 
observational  frequency,  i.e., k > 2.  Therefore,  rational  expectations 
imply a—O and b—I in  the following  regression: 
s(t+k) 
-  s(t) — a  + b(5e(,k)S))  + u(t)  (4.2), 
The  test statistics  are calculated  using the General  Method  of  Moments  to 
take care of the serial  correlations  of  u(t).  Results of this  unbiasedness 
test are  reported  in Table 4. 
INSERT  TABLE  4  ABOUT  HERE 
Unbiasedness  is rejected  for trading  companies  and insurance  companies 
of the one-month  horizon,  for securities  and import companies  of the  three- 
month  horizon,  and for all groups  but banks  and import  industries  for  the 
six-month horizon.  These rejections  are evidence  for rejecting  a  rational 
expectation  hypothesis,  in that  market  participants  had unbiased  forecasts. 
We would  miss some rejections  if we were only to look  at the average of  the 
forty-four  participants,  since  for the one-month  and three-month horizons, 
rejections by  some  groups  are  not  detected  in  the  average  for  all 
participants. 
The  second  implication  of rational  expectation  is the orthogonality  of 
forecast  errors  and any information  at time t.  Under the null  hypothesis, 
forecast  errors,  e(t,k)  Se(k) 
-  s(t+k),  are  uncorrelated from  any 
information  at time t.  In  the literature,  the past forecast  errors 
se(tkk)s(t); the  forward  premium,  f(t,k)-s(t);  or  the  recent  actual 
change  s(t-k)-s(t)  have  been  popular candidates  for  a  variable  in  the 
information set.  In this section,  I will follow  the standard  procedure  by 
15 regressing  the cx post forecast  errors on these  candidate  variables. 
Se(k)  - s(t+k) — a + b(E5e(k.k)5())  + e(t)  (.3) 
e(k) -  s(t+k)  a + b(f(t.k)-s(t)) + e(t) 
5e(k) 
-  s(t+k)  = a + b(s(t-k)-s(t)) + e(t)  4.3) 
Rational  expectation  (orthogonality)  is a null hypothesis  of a  b  0 
in  each  case.  Results of estimation  of these  equations  and tests  of  the 
null  hypothesis  are  reported  in  Tables  5.A  -  5G.  In  each  piece  of 
information,  there  are only  a few instances  of rejections  of the  one-month 
and  three-month horizons.  However,  for the  six-month  horizon,  it  is 
unanimous  in rejection.  This is consistent  with the results  of unbiasedness 
tests.  So far,  there  is little  evidence  rejecting  the rational  expectation 
hypothesis  for the shorter  horizons. 
Variables  in  the  information  set are not  restricted  to  those  tested 
above.  When the second  lagged  term is added in the case of recent  movement 
of the exchange  rate,  the number  of rejection  cases  increases  dramatically. 
Results of estimating  the following  equation  are reported  in Table SD: 
— a + b1(s(t-k)-s(t)) + b2(s(t-k-l)-s(t-l))  ÷ e(t)  (4.6) 
Table  S.D  shows  rejections  for most groups  in any horizon.  Even  if  the 
authogonality  test  is  conducted  at the individual  level,  about  three- 
quarters  of individuals  are judged  to be irrational  (Table SD). 
INSERT  Table 5  (5.A -  SD)  about  here 
In  sum,  this section  shows  that  most of market  participants  violate  a 
necessary  condition  of the rational  expectation  hypothesis,  in that  their 
forecasting methods  could benefit from  analyzing  the relationship between 
16 their  own  forecast  errors  and information available  at  the  time  of 
forecasting.  Tables  also show  that the rational  expectation  hypothesis  can 
be  rejected  in the individual  level  without  being  detected  in  the  cross- 
section  aggregated  (average)  data. 
5.  Expectational  Twist 
5.1  Introduction  to Twist  and Consistency 
In  this  section,  the expectation  formation  of short-  vs.  long-term 
expectations  is  explored.  Recall  Table  1,  where  the  average  market 
participant  expected  1.42  percent appreciation  in one month,  1.43  percent 
appreciation in  three  months,  and only 0.04 percent  appreciation in  six 
months.  This  shows  that  the short-term  expectation  is of  the  bandwagon 
type,  while  the  long-term  expectations  show  some  regressive 
characteristics.  Similar  characteristics  have also  been  discovered  in 
other  expectation  data sets (Frankel  and Froot  (1987b)).8 
Casual  observations  from Figure  1  (in the Introduction)  suggest  thar 
during  the  wave  of  appreciation,  the JCIF  participants also  show  the 
extrapolative  (bandwagon)  expectation  for the one-month  ahead expectations, 
while  the  regressive  expectation  may be more appropriate  for  the  longer 
horizon.  (This  creates  a "twist"  in arrows  of Figure  1.)  It seems  that  a 
conclusion  similar  to Frankel  and Froot  may also be obtained  for  the  JCIF 
data.  It is tempting  to replicate  their  regressions. 
However,  Frankel  and Froot  (1987b)  ignored  the consistency  issue  of 
short-  and long-term  expectation  formation:  If an expectation  formation  is 
internally  consistent,  a long-term  forecast  should  be identical  to a  result 
of  sequential  substitutions  of short-term  forecasts,  given a  function  of 
expectation  formation.  The consistency  becomes a testable  hypothesis  in the 
17 form  of cross-equation  constraints  on coefficients  of short- and  long-term 
forecast  equations.  Even in the presense of a twist,  one might  not  reject 
consistency,  if  the expectation  formation  is sufficiently  complicated  to 
allow for non-linear  forecasts, 
This consistency  problem  is parallel  to the cross-equation  constraints 
implied in  the context of the interest  rate term structure (Sargent  (1979)) 
and  in  the context  of uncovered  interest  parity  (Ito (1988) and  Ito  and 
Quah (1988)).  Froot  and Ito  (1988)  have applied  the test of consistency  to 
data  collected  by Money Market  Service  (MMS) for one-week  and  one-month 
ahead forecasts  and Economist  Financial  Report for three-,  six- and twelve- 
month forecasts.  In this paper,  the same test  is applied to the JCIF  data, 
where one-,  three-  and six-month  forecasts  are available. 
5,2  An Example of Extrapolative  expectation  with One 
First,  let  us  consider,  following  Frankel and  Froot  (1987b),  the 
extrapolative  expectation  with one lag: 
e(k) - s(t) —  a + b(s(t-l)-s(t)) + e(t)  (Si). 
In  (5.1), b < 0  implies  a (destabilizing)  bandwagon  while b > 0  implies  a 
stabilizing  expectation  formation.  Results  are reported in  Table  6,  which 
shows  that  the  one  percent  yen appreciation would  make  the  averagae 
individual  expect  a further  0.01 appreciation  in one month.  However,  the 
Table  also implies that  the shock  would  make the same individual  to form  an 
expectation of  a  0.13 percent  depreciation  in three months  and  a  0.22 
percent  depreciation in  six  months.  Although  different  groups  have 
different  biases,  the pattern of  coefficients, 
b(one month) <  b(three  month)  < b(six month) 
18 is  almost  unanimously  observed  across  the board.  Hence,  we  may  draw  a 
conclusion,  similar  to  Frankel  and Froot  (l9&7b).  that  the  long-term 
expectation  is more stabilizing  than  the short-term  expectation. 
INSERT  TABLE  6  about here 
Next,  in order to illustrate  the consistency  problem.  let  us  assume 
that  one-month  and three-month  forecasts  are formed  with  the 
following  formulae (with  one time period  —4  weeks): 
5e(l) 
- s(t)  — a + b(s(t-l)-s(t))  (5.2) 
Se(3) 
-  s(t) — A  + B(s(t-l)-s(t))  (5.3), 
or after  rearranging  terms, 
5e(l) — a + (l-b)s(t)  + bs(t-l)  (5.4) 
s°(tS) A+  (l-B)s(t)  + Bs(t-l)  (5.5). 
By  iterating  the  short-term  expectation,  the  expectation  of  a  longer 
horizon  can  be obtained.  With the information  available  at time  t,  the 
following  substitution  explains the iterated  projection. 
— a + (lb)5e(+2) + bSe(+l)  (5.6) 
where 5e(+2)  — 5e(+ll)  and 
5e(÷ll)  — a + (lb)5e(+l) +  bs(t)  (5.7) 
where 5e(÷l)  — 5e(l)  From (5.4),  (5.6) and (5.7), we obtain 
5e(+2l)  — 2a + a(l-b)2  + (1-b+b2-b3)s(t)  + (b-b2+b3)s(t-1)  (5.8). 
19 However,  if one-month  and three-month  expectation  formations  are consistent 
with  each  other,  (5.8)  should  be equivalent  to  (55).  Therefore,  rhe 
following  cross-equation constraints should be imposed  on  a  system  of 
equations,  (5.4)  and (5.5): 
A  = 2a + a(l-b)2 
B — b(l-b-4-b2) 
This is the testable  hypothesis  of consistency  between  one- and three-month 
extrapolative  expectation  with one lag. 
It  is  easy to show  that if b is negative,  as estimated  in  Table  6. 
equation  (5.4),  then  B has to be  a.lso negative.  Thus,  so  long  as  the 
extrapolative  expectation  with one lag is assumed,  a  twist  in  expectation 
is  impossible.  An unstable  bandwagon  in the shrot-term  (b<0) and a  stable 
weighted  average (6>0)  in  the long-term  expectation  would be  most  likely 
internally  inconsistent  in  the extrapolative  expectation  with only  one lag. 
Put  differently,  the  assumed  formulation  is not rich enough  to  give  a 
chance  for the observed  twist to be consistent. 
5.3  Consistency  Tests 
Next,  we  adopt a distributed  lag expectation  formulation with  more 
than  two  lags,  rich enough  to produce  a twist  in  expectation.  Consider 
estimating the following  one-month  and three-month  expectation formations 
(with,  again,  one period  — 4  weeks): 
5e(l) — d + (l+a)s(t) +  bs(t-l) ÷ cs(t-2)  ÷ u(t)  (5.9) 
5e(3) — D + (l+A)s(t) + Bs(t-l)  + Cs(t-2)  + v(t)  (5.10) 
where  u  and v are independent,  random  variable  representing observation 
20 errors.  After  substitution parallel  to the  preceding  subsection,  the 
consistency  in this case becomes  the following  cross-equation  constraints: 
0 — 2d + ad + bd  + (l+a)d2  (511) 
A —  c  -  1  + 2(l+a)b + (l+a)3  (5.12) 
B — (l+a)c  + b2 + (l'a)b2  (5.13) 
C — c(l+a)2  + bc  (5.14) 
Now,  let us consier  the consistency  requirement  for the consistency  of 
the  three-month and  six-month  expectations.  Suppose.  again,  that  the 
expectation  formation  is of the distributed  lag form  with two lags: 
5e(3)  d + 55(t)  +  bs(t-3)  + cs(t-6)  + u(t)  (5.15) 
(6)  — D  + As(t)  + Bs(t-3)  + Cs(t-6)  + v(t)  (5,16): 
The  consitency  can be expressed  as the following  cross-equation  constraint: 
0 — (2+a)d  (5.16) 
A —  (1+a)2  +  b  -  1  (5.18) 
B  — (l+a)b  + c  (5.19) 
C — (l+a)c  (5.20) 
Each  of two sets of cross-equation  restrictions  (5.ll)-(5.l4)  and  (5.17)- 
(5.20)  is  tested  separately,  and results  are  reported  in  Table  7.  The 
consistency  is overwhelmingly  rejected  in this formulation,  too, 
INSERT TABLE 7 about  here 
One  common  reaction  from  market  participants to  the  result  of 
rejecting  the consistency  is that they  use different  economic  variables  for 
forecasting  the  future  spot rate  with different  horizons.  They  often 
21 explain to us that the chart (technical)  analysis,  which is a special  case 
of  (univariate)  distributed  lag expectation  formations,  is used  for  the 
short-term  horizon,  but other factors  come into considerations  for  the long- 
term  horizon.  A  list of other factors  includes  announced  balances  of 
payments,  inflation  rate differentials,  interest  rate differentials  (that  is 
the  forward  rate  under  covered interest  parity)  and  fiscal  deficits. 
However,  if  these  factors  are relevent  in the long-run,  they  should  be 
relevant  in the short-run,  though  the effect  may be small  in the short-run.9 
Of course,  if we misspecify  the expectation  formation,  then results  in  this 
section is not valid.  However,  it is not obvious  what we would be  missing. 
Instead,  results  could indicate  that  market  participants,  who are buying  and 
selling  every  minute,  are naive enough  to give inconsistent  forecasts  of 
months  ahead. 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, the newly-available survey data on the expected exchange 
rate  in  the Tokyo  market  were used to test  several  hypotheses  regarding 
expectation  formations.  The JCIF  data set  is better  than  the  data  sets 
previously  used by Frankel  and Froot (i987a,b),  in that the survey  includes 
expectations  of  different  industries,  not  only  banks  and  financial 
institutions  but  also  exporters  and  importers.  Moreover,  individual 
responses  can be used to avoid  aggregation  problem  altogether. 
Two  versions  of  the rational  expectations hypothesis were  tested. 
Following  are the major  findings  of this paper:  First,  market  participants 
are heterogeneous. Different  individuals  seem  to have constant-term  biases 
in  their  expectation  formations.  Among  different  groups,  unbiasedness of 
expectation was  rejected  in  a few instances  for  shorter  horizons  and 
22 unanimously  rejected  in  the  six-month  horizons,  The  orthogonality was 
soundly  rejected.  We may conclude  that  we have a strong  evidence  aginat 
rational  expectation  formation in  the Tokyo  foreign exchange  market. 
Then  we turn to the  issue  of consistency  between  the short- and  long- 
horizon  forecasts  by  the  same  participants.  They  are  overwhei.minglv 
rejected,  given  that  the  expectation formation  is  a  distributed lag 
structure  with two lags. 
23 FOOTNOTES 
Dominguez  (1986) used the Money Market  Service  (11115)  data form 1583  to 
1985  to  test  a rational  expectations  hypothesis.  Unbiasedness and  the 
independence of forecast  errors  from the forward premium  were teated.  $he 
found  that  survey  forecasts  were no better  than the spot rate  in  predictive 
power  and that the rationality  was  in  general  rejected.  In addition  to  the 
MMS data.  Frankel  and Froot (1987a.b)  exploited  the survey  data collected  by 
Amex  Financial  Service,  Economists,  which  have a longer sample  period  and 
different  forecast  horizons.  They found  that expectations  do  respond  to 
exchange  rate  changes.  Moreover,  short-term  foreoaats  are  more 
"destabilizing"  than  long-term  forecasts;  that is, the  response  to  the 
degree  of forecasted  appreciation  in response  to appreciation  is larger  in 
the short-term  horizon  than the long-term.  The risk premium  implied by  the 
data show  a premiun  for dollar-denominated  assets. 
2 
gratefully  acknowledge  the help  and encouragement  from  Tomomitsu  Oba, 
Shoji  Oohi  and  Eisuke  Sakakibara  in allowing  me  access  to  the  JCIF 
proprietary  data for academic  purposes  only. 
About 60 experts  in banks  and other  financial  institutions,  but  not  in 
other  sectors,  are on  the list of the ?24S survey.  It is not  mandatory  or 
insisted  by  tillS that  all people  on  the list respond  every week.  Depending 
on who was available  for polis,  the number  of actual  reponses  varies between 
30 and 40.  Therefore,  even if individual  responses  were made available  for 
econometric  analysis,  frequently missing  observations would  make  the 
analysis  very difficult. 
The first  few surveys were conducted  not on Wednesdays  but on the  middle 
Footnotes  page 1 and last business  days  of the month.  However,  the survey  date was fixed  on 
wednesday  after the fourth  observation.  A twice-a-month  survey  means  that 
observations  are usually  bi-weeklv.  with a couple  of exceptions  in  a  year. 
That  is,  there  are 24, in stead  of 26, observations  in the JCIF  data in  52 
weeks.  It is unfortunate  that the interval  is not fixed,  In the following. 
I disregard  the problem  arising  from a mix of two and  three week  intervals. 
The  survey  started with 42 companies  and expanded  to the current  44  after 
the fourth  survey  in July 1985. 
Since  the micro panel  data set was made available  on the condition  that 
the anonymity  of the source  should  be honored,  it is impossible  to aggregate 
individuals  into groups. 
6  It  is  weil-lcnown  that  it takes a long time to  have  changes  in  the 
exchange  rate  "pass-through"  to domestic  prices.  For  example,  Japanese 
exporters  absorb some of the exchange  rate fluctuations  by changing  profit 
margins  and  the yeri-donominated export  price,  so that  the  U.S.  domestic 
price of the Japanese  products  do not fluctuate  much;  and Japanese importers 
do  not  change  the Japanese  domestic  price  as much as the  change  in  the 
exchange  rate,  while  most imports  are denominated  in  the  dollar.  These 
pricing  behavior  is  possible  when  the  exporters  and  importers  have 
differentiated  products  and/or  have substantial  adjustment  costs  for gaining 
a  market  share.  See Krugman  (1987) and Olmo (1988) and references  thereof 
for the theory  and empirical  evidence  on (the lack of)  "pass-through." 
The  group  effect  of trading  companies  behaves  like  that  of  import 
industries.  One  might  think that the  change  in the exchange rate  may  be 
neutral for trading  companies,  since  they are  just intermediaries  of  import 
and  export.  However,  the leading Japanese  trading  companies  handle  more 
Footnotes  page 2 import  than  export.  In 1983,  revenues  of the leading  nine  trading  oompanies 
are  derived  from  export-oriented  activities  for  20.01.  import-oriented 
activities  for  23.6%, domestic  activities  for 40.3%.  and  trades  between 
foreign  countries  for 40.3%  (Shinohara  (1986:  p.  164)).  Therefore,  a 
finding  that  trading  companies  behave  like  import  companies  is  not 
inconsistent  with the wishful  expectation  hypothesis. 
For the aspects of  econometrics,  see Mishkin  (1983).  The  same  procedure 
has  been  applied to  the 4S  data by Dominguez  (1986). 
8  Frankel  and Froot  (1986b)  showed,  using  the .tS,  Economist,  and AMEX  data 
set,  that  short-  and  long-term  expectations seem  to  have  different 
characteristics.  The data set with short-term  horizon yields  the  estimates 
indicating  a bandwagon  type  (extrapolative),  while the data set with a long- 
term  horizon  yields  the result  with more  regressive  nature.  However,  the 
direct  comparison  of short-term  and long-term  horizon  is limited  in  their 
study,  due  to  horizons  spread  across different  data  sets  and  different 
sample  periods. 
Suppose  that  uncovered  interest  parity (no risk  premium)  holds.  An 
interest  rate differential  of six percents  implies  that the  exchange  rate 
changes  by approximately  three  percent  in six months,  which is  significant 
and easy  to detenct.  However, it predicts  only s 0.5 percent  change in  one 
month,  which  is small and may escape  detection.  However,  this  does  not 
explain  an apparent  twist  observed  in our data.  During the sample  period, 
the  U.S.  interest  rates  were  consistently higher  than  the  Japanese 
counterparts.  However,  the expectational  twist  predicted  yen  depreciation 
from the third  month to  the  six month after  the time of forecast. 
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F  0-  --  — 
0  — 
I 
0I Z0  B  —  SEC 
RA  ——  EXPDR  — 
INS  —  INPORT  -— 
VE  —- TABLE  1:  uncond1t.cnal Epecec  rarqe 
Tim. mean of (s(t,k( 
— 
Mean  of the (unconditional)  e,ected change  in  4) 
Not annualized or adjusted for  . 
May  1985  — June  1987,  number  of observatiOn  = 51 
Horizon  1  rIONTH  3 MONTH  MONTH 
AVE  —1.420  —1.431  —0.04H 
BAN  —1.404  —1.58  -0.957 
SEC  —1.097  —0.834  +Q.a21 
TPA  —1.956  —2.453  -0.948 
EXP  —0.775  —0.137  +j73 
INS  —1.746  —2.309  ÷0.302 
IMP  —1.Q37  —1.536  —0.430 
FOR  -0.150  -0.430  —0.957 
ACT  —2.064  -3.970  —11.987 
Definit  ion: 
AyE:  in place of 
FOR:  f(t,k) in place of 
ACT:  s(t+k)  in place of Table  1  (continued) 
Distribution among  individual respondents f  the time cnean 
of forecasted changes  in the exchange  rate aver  the  specified  horizon 
HOR  I  ZON 
P 
1  respondent  1  respondent  1  rpondent 









+15  I  — 
I  I  +1.0 
U  —  +0.5 
0.0  U  — 
-0.5  —  — 
-1.0  — 
I  __ 
— .5 
-2.0  I 
-2.5 
-3.0 
-3.!  U  U 
-4.0  I  I 
-4.!  U 
-5.0  I  I 
Max  1.41  Max  3.25  4.62 
Mjr,  —3.10  Mm  —4.76  Mm  —5.20 Table  2: (ishfu1  Expectations 
(a)  Group  Deviations from the Total  Average, for each  norizon, 
s(t.) 
— SAVE(t>  =  4  e(t) 
Unit  deviation  from  the  cross—section average, 
May  1985  — June  1987,  sOBS  51 
HORIZON  1  nonth  3 onth  6  month 
a  DW  or  RHO  a  OW  or  RHO  a  DW  or  RHO 
BAN  0.017  0.28'.  —0.228  0.530  —0.941  0.371 
t—tat  (0.25)  (2.04)  (—1.28)  (4.29>  (—5.74)*  (2.81) 
SEC  0.305  0.438  0.561  0.421  0.743  0.446 
t—stat  (1.25)  (3.38>  (1.62>  >3.14>  (1.47)  (3.49) 
IRA  —0.536  DW.2.13  -1.022  DW=1.61  —0.908  0.467 
t—.t.t  (—4.98).  (—7.56>.  (—2.57)*  (3.61> 
EXP  0.645  DW2.07  1.294  DW—1.62  1.832  0.435 
t—stat  (8.55>.  (12.68).  (6.11>.  >3.41) 
INS  —0.326  0.474  —0.815  0.645  0.301  0.661 
t—stat  (—1.54)  (3.72)  (—1.93>.  (5.86)  (0.54)  >5.99> 
IMP  —0.517  DW—1.'.7  —0.079  0.301  —0.434  0.422 
t—stat  (—3.76>.  (—0.29)  (2.17)  (—1.39>  (3.27) 
• show. the  heterogeneous"  group at the  1.ve1 of  1  ). 
Table 28: Wimhful Expectations  II 
S(t,k) 
— S(t,k> 
HORIZON  1  month  3  month  6 Sonth 
a  OW  or  RHO  a  DU or  RHO  a  OW  or  RHO 
EXP—IMP  1.162  044—1.67  1.399  DW.1.61  2.271  0.460 
t—stat  (6.73).  (6.09).  (4.19>.  (3.68> 
EXP—TRA  1.181  DW—2.21  2.365  0.272  2.744  0.502 
t—stat  (7.98).  (10.31).  (2.01)  (5.09)*  (4.04) Tabl• 2 (continued) 
Table 2C:  Distribution of individual effects 
u 
—  significant  individual effects; 
insignificant individual effects. 
HORIZON 
1  MONTH  3 MONTH  6 MONTH 
+5.0 
I  I  I  +4.0 
I  I  +3.5 
+3.0 
I  S 
+2.5 
+2.0 
i  w  r  +1.5 
I 
+1.0 




L  t 
-2.5  I  tt 
-3.0  I  I 
-3.5  I  U 
-4.0  I 
—4.5 
-5  • 0 
-5.5 Table 3: Idiosyncratic effects 
Extrapolative  form 
4  ' 
HO:  No  idiosyncratic  coefficient  effects, b = 0 
(a1la+ing  for  individual  effect of  a constant bias) 
HI:  No  idiosyncratic  coefficient  or  individual  (constant) 
effect,  a—bO 
Lag  length  1  lag (b2  0)  2 lag 
HORIZON  1  month  3 month  6 month  1  month  3 month  6 month 
HO  Hi  HO  Hi  HO  Hi  HO  Hi  HO  Hi  HO  Hi 
BAN  F—stat  .122 .103  2.5i 2.48  2.34 18.19  .433 .338  2.60 3.13  .732 17.3 
signif  .729 .903  .120 .095  .133 .000*  .651  .798  .086 .035  .487  .000* 
SEC F—stat  .815 i.37  .037 1.41  .000 1.03  .699 i.Si  .281 1.32  .032 .740 
signif  .371  .265  .847 .253  .984 .367  .502  .224  .756 .290  .968 .533 
YRA  F—stat  .461 21.0  .390 24.6  .652 5.16  1.69 16.76 1.91 18.0  .583 4.01 
signif  .500 .000*  .535 .000* .423 .009.  .196 .000* .161  .000.  .562  .013 
EXP  F—stat 4.28  40.5  2.16 66.44+  .557 iB.33  2.29  52.1  2.88 64.8  .186 18.6 
signif  .044+  .000*  .148 .000. .459 .000*  .113  .000* .067 .000. .831  .000* 
INS F—stat  .429  2.12  2.29 3.56  3.49 1.89  .347 1.69  1.i2 2.71  1.46 1.14 
signif  .516 .132  .317 .037  .068 .162  .708 .186  .335 .056  .242  .345 
IMP F—stat  3.68 7.70  1.36 .726  1.29 2.31  1.73 5.4i  1.08 .763  1.07  1.93 
signif  .061  .001*  .249 .489  .262 .1i0  .188 .003  .347 .521  .352 .139 Table  .: Unbias.dness 
s(tsk) — s(t)  a + b(e't,k>—s(t)) 
H:  a = 0,  b  1 
Generalized  M.thod of Mo.nts,  *Obe  51 
Estisates of  a and b and their  (standard errors) 
HORIZON  (k) 
1  MONTH  3 MONTH  6 MONTH 
a  b  CI1ISQ  a  b  CHISQ  a  b  CHISQ 
AVE  -0.028  —0.485  2.59  —0.043  1.167  5.21  —0.119  0.908  10.09 
(0.017) (0.969)  .274  (0.034)  (1.167>  .07'.  (0.041) (0.741> .006 
SAN  —0.021  —0.059  2.00  —0.044  0.945  3.69  -0.118  0.220  7.90 
(0.015) (0.789)  .36B  >0.03'.)  (1.226)  .158  (0.045) (0.857) .019 
SEC  —0.015  0.517  1.97  -0.054  0.706  9.37  —0.124  0.593  9.21 
(0.017)  (0.502)  .373  (0.025) (0.292)  .009  (0.041> (0.327) .009 
TRA  —0.036  -0.793  23.35  —0.050  0.399  2.39  -0.110  1.038  13.3'. 
(0.010) (0.371)  .000  (0.039) (0.947)  .303  (0.042> (0.206)  .001 
EXP  -0.021  0.001  3.98  -0.058  0.896  8.86  —0.143  1.307  12.86 
>0.010) (0.747)  .137  (0.024) (0.764)  .012  (0.040) (0.443>  .002 
INS  —0.030  —0.509  10.33  —0.066  —0.264  3.92  —0.122  0.595  9.64 
(0.011) >0.472)  .006  (0.034> (0.967)  .141  >0.039> (0.665) .008 
IMP  -0.023  —0.139  '..76  —0.044  1.019  28.41  —0.120  -0.016  8.é9 
(0.016> (0.564>  .092  >0.027) (0.352)  .000  (0.041>  (0.579> .013 
FOR  —0.034  —9.870  8.93  —0.104 —10.360  8.97  —0.207  —9.159  12.25 
(0.013)  (7.432)  .012  (0.040)  (6.702>  .011  >0.069) (3.699> .002 Tae  5: 0rhoqonality 
5.A.  Past Forecast  Errors as an information  set 
C  C  s  )t,k>  — s(tk)  a  4-  b)s  )t—k,k)—s(t 
H: a = 0,  b  0,  tested by Generalized  Method  of Moments,  $Obm = 
CF  = '.7 
Estimates of a and b and their  (standard errors) 
Chi—square  (df  =2)  and its )siqn:ficance level) 
HORIZON  (k) 
I  MONTH  3 MONTH  6 MONTH 
a  D  CHISQ  a  b  CHISO  a  0  CHISQ 
(st.er) )st.er)  Signif  )st.er)  (st.er) Signif )st.er)  )st.er)  Signif 
AVE  0.005  0.049  0.881  0.019  0.341  6.174  0.042  0.307 228.70 
(0.009) (0.168)0.644  (0.020) (0.191) 0.045  (0.012) (0.193)  0.000* 
BAN  0.006  -0.002  0.608  0.016  0.359  6.467  0.033  0.317  61.553 
(0.009)  (0.177)  0.738  (0.019) (0.180) 0.039  (0.010)  (0.182)  0.000. 
SEC  0.010  -0.062  1.331  0.021  0.375  10.300  0.04'.  0.336 373.57 
(0.009) (0.131)0.51'.  (0.019) (0.149) 0.006*  (0.003)  0.164)  0.000* 
IRA  —0.000  0.100  0.589  0.011  0.337  7.'.09  0.030  0.346 206.15 
(0.009)  (0.160)  0.745  (0.019) (0.140) 0.025  (0.009)  (0.184)  0.000* 
EXP  0.011  0093  3.729  0.029  0.321  8.075  0.059  0.293  77.'.82 
(0.009)  (0.171)  0.155  (0.022) (0.207) 0.018  (0.022)  0.191)  0.000* 
INS  0.001  0.159  1.649  0.020  0.200  2.117  0.065  0.179  47.248 
(0.009) (0.157)  0.438  (0.021) (0.213) 0.347  (0.023)  (0.220)  0.000* 
IMP  0.000  0.046  0.080  0.017  0.352  6.006  0.047  0.244 114.11 
(0.008)  (0.184)  0.961  (0.020) (0.218) 0.050  (0.012)  (0.206)  0.000. 
FOR  0.018  0.022  7.572  0.040  0.1'.'.  5.579  0.048  0.208 478.02 
(0.010)  (0.176)  0.023  (0.018) (0.166) 0.061  (0.013) (0.223)  0.000* 5.B:  Forward Premium  as an information  set 
— s(t+k)  = a  + b(f(t,k)—s(t) 
)  +  e)t 
-4  a — 0,  b  0,  tested  by Generalized  Method  of Moments,  *Obs = 51 
Estimates of a and b and their  standard errors) 
Chi—square  )df 2)  and its )5iqnifcance  level) 
HOPIZON  (k) 
1  MONTH  3 MONTH  4 MONTH 
a  b  CHISQ  a  b  CHISQ  a  b  CHISO 
)st.er) (st.er)  Signif  (st.er) )st.er)  Signif  )st.er) (st.rl Sqnif 








12.23  6.662 
(6.745)  0.036 
0.221 
0.069) 
l0.1  15.744 
(3.823)  0.000* 












10.85  11.342 
(4.349) 0.303* 












8.18  45.092 
(4.557)  0.000* 








12.07  5.06 
(7.011)  0.080 
0.191 
(0.067) 
8.44  13.279 
(3.565) 3.001* 












11.25  23.922 
(3.022) 0.000* 








11.59  4.411 
(7.323)  0.110 
0.245 
(0.059) 
12.77  17.387 
(3.154)  0.000* 








11.35  5.843 
(6.750)  0.054 
0.222 
(0.075) 
11.10  13.559 
(4.204)  0.001* 
FOR  0.017  0.187 18.94  0.104  11.36  8.97  0.207  10.14  11.485 
(0.009)  >0.206)  0.000  >0.040)  (6.702> 0.011  (0.067) (3.760)  3303* S.C.  Past echinge  rate  changes:  One  lag  ersxon 
— s(t+k(  =  a  + b(s)t—l '—5(t)  +  e(t) 
H:  a  = 0,  b = 0,  tested  by Generalized  Method  of Moments,  NObs = 51 
Estimates of  a and b and their (standard e-rors 
Chi—square  (df 2(  and its  (significance ieve) 
HORIZON  (> 
1  MONTH  3 MONTH  o MONTH 
a  b  0H152  a  b  HISQ  a  6  CHISO 
(st.er( (st.er)  Signif  (st.er) (st.er)  Signif  (st.er)  (st.er( Signif 
AVE  0.004  0.166  3.883  0.042  0.306  9.504  0.114  0.227  12.908 
(0.010) (0.203) 0.144  (0.025) (0.225) 0.0094  (0.036)  (0.358) 0.000* 
BAN  0.004  0.167  3.725  0.041  0.233  6.440  0.105  0.178  16.195 
(0.009) (0.200) 0.155  (0.024) (0.244> 0.040  (0.038) (0.3B5) 0.000* 
SEC  o.ooe  0.069  7.534  0.047  0.389  11.327  0.120  0.318  10.274 
>0.009) (0.218) 0.023  (0.026) (0.329) 0.003*  (0.039) (0.305) 0.006* 
IRA  —0.002  0.172  1.214  0.032  0.280  5.604  0.106  0.137  11.860 
(0.010) (0.216) 0.545  (0.025) (0.264) 0.060  (0.036) (0.325) 0.003* 
EXP  0.010  0.232  9.290  0.054  0.382  17.283  0.132  0.230  32.705 
(0.010) (0.212) 0.009*  (0.024> (0.182) 0.000*  (0.033) (0.381) 0.000* 
INS  —0.000  0.225  4.131  0.033  0.315  6.940  0.117  0.263  20.602 
(0.010)  >0.196> 0.127  (0.024) >0.188> 0.031  (0.035) (0.358) 0.000* 
IMP  -0.000  0.053  0.018  0.041  0.344 11.643  0.108  0.365  13.874 
(0.010)  (0.220) 0.947  (0.023) (0.253) 0.003.  0.037) (0.388)  0.001. 
FOR  0.017  0.187  18.9'.  0.054  0.124  7.74  0.108  -0.142  25.93 
>0.009> (0.206> 0.000  O.024(  (0.221)  0.021  (0.036)  (0.375)  0.000. 
Number of  Cases in  Micro Data 
1  month  3  month  6  month 
Fail to reject H  37  26  11 
(at  1%) 
Reject H  7  18  33 
Cat  1%) Table  5:  (continued) 
5.0. Past Exchange rate changes: Two  lag version 
st)tk) —s)t+k)  a+b(s)t—l)—s)t))  +c(sLt—2)—s)t—1))  + c)t) 
I-I:  a = 0,  b = 0, c = 0,  tested  by Generalized  Method of Moments, *Obs = 51 
Estimates of a b  and c and their  (standard  errors) 
Chi—square Cdt =3)  and its  significance  level) 
408120$  k) 
I  MONTH  3  MONTH  i MONTH 
a  b  c  HISQ  a  0  c  10138  a  6 
st,er)  )st.er  Signif  st.er  star)  Siqnif  st.er  stan  Siqnif 
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Number of cases  among Micro Data 
1  month  3  month  6  month 
Fail  to reject  H  (1%):  11  22  21 
Reject  H  (1%)  :  33  22  23 labi. :  Expctation  Formation 
Extrapolative expectation with one  lag 
(t,k) 
— s(t)  a  + bCs(t—1)  — s)t))  + (t) 
Cases;  b  < 0  belief in a bandwagon 
b = 0  belief  in constant appreciation 
b  > 0  distributed  lag form 
H:  a = b  = 0  belief  in random alk 
Estimates of a  and  b  and  their  )standard errors) 
CHISQ  for Hypothesis  H:  chisg(df=2)  and  (significance level) 
AR1  process on  is  assumed.  RHO  is not  reported here. 
HORIZON  (k) 
1  MONTH  3 MONTH  6 MONTH 
a  b  CHISO  a  b  CHISQ  a  b  CHISO 
AVE  -.015  —.011  49.42  -.017  .137  9.60  -.002  .220  5.49 
(.002)  (.035)  .000  (.005)  (.050)  .000  (.009)  (.066)  0.002 
BAN  -.01'.  —.008  62.85  —.019  .087  6.75  -.011  .13'.  2.06 
(.001)  (.044)  .000  (.005)  (.056)  .003  (.009)  (.071)  .139 
SEC  -.011  —.058  8.05  -.011  .149  2.46  .006  .224  1.69 
(.003)  (.061)  .001  (.005)  (.108)  .097  (.009)  (.141)  .195 
IRA  —.020  —.029  69.67  -.027  .067  21.42  —.011  .19'.  2.41 
(.002)  (.068)  .000  (.004)  (.096)  .000  (.006)  (.120)  .101 
EXP  —.009  .061  18.82  -.004  .168  3.19  .016  .304  6.77 
(.001)  (.039>  .000  (.004)  (.068)  .050  (.010)  (.095)  .003 
INS  —.018  .015  17.20  -.027  .237  18.42  -.001  .376  5.79 
(.003)  (.067)  .000  (.005)  (.068)  .000  (.010)  (.111)  .006 
IMP  —.018  -.134  28.43  -.019  .295  6.95  —.008  .288  3.60 
(.003)  (.075)  .000  (.006)  (.108)  .002  (.008>  (.110)  .035 
FOR  —.001  —.007  18.28  —.004  .030  15.59  —.011  —.169  7.89 
(.000)  (.007)  .000  (.001)  (.011)  .000  (.003)  (.011)  .001 
Numbsr of Cases In Micro Data, 
Horizon  1  month  3 month  6 month 
b >> 0  sig.  3  8  10 
b  >0 insig.  18  29  31 
b <  0  insig.  20  7  3 
b<<0 sig.  3  0  0 Table 7:  Consistency  Tests 
One—month )k2) vs.  three—month  (k=6)  expectations 
s(t,l> 
— s(t)  d + as(t>  + bs(t—l>  + cs(t—) 
st,3 
—  s(t)  d + As(t>  +  Bs(t—I)  + Cs(t—3.) 
H:  Consistency  restrictions:  D=(2+a+b+()1+a)**EH*d 
A=c1+(2*(l+a)*b>((1a)**3) 
Estimates  and (standard errors> 
1  MONTH (OLS)  3 MONTH (GMM)  H 
d  a  b  c  0  A  B  C  CHISQ 
AVE  -.0261  .0003  .0001  —.0003  —.0254  -.0008  .0005  .0003  2182.1 
.0050)  (.0001)  (.0002)  (.0001)  .0071)  (.0071)  (.0001)  (.0001)  .300 
BAN  —.0202  .0002  .0000  -.0003  —.0272  -.0005  .0000  .0005  493.0 
.0061>  ( .0002)  (.0002)  ( .0001)  ( .0062)  (.0001)  ( .0001)  (.0001)  .000 
SEC  -.0061  .0005  -.0003  -.0003  —.0056  -.0014  .0001  .0013  39.7 
(.0102)  (.0003>  (.0003)  (.0002)  (.0152)  (.0004)  (.0003)  (.0001)  .000 
IRA  -.0388  .0001  .0003  —.0003  -.0471  -.0007  .0009  -.0001  12403.3 
(.0093)  (.0002)  (.0003)  (.0002)  (.0073>  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0001)  .000 
EXP  -.0190  .0000  .0002  -.0002  —.0142  -.0011  .0010  .0002  77.2 
.0056)  (.0001)  (.0002)  (.0001)  (.0050)  (.0001>  (.0002>  (.0001)  .000 
INS  -.0497  .0004  .0006  —.0008  —.0423  -  .0004  .0010  —.0005  428. 
(.0096>  (.0003)  (.0003>  (.0002)  (.0085)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0001)  .000 
IMP  —.0346  .0006  -.0005  -.0000  —.0148  -.0010  .0002  .0008  3718.9 
(.0114)  (.0003)  (.0004)  (.0003)  (.0208)  (.0002)  (.0003)  (.0002>  .000 
FOR  —.0053  .0000  —.0000  .0000  —.0116  .0001  -.0001  .0000  53.6 
(.0009)  (.0000>  (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0008)  (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0000)  .000 
In Micro  Data,  for only 2 individuals,  H is failed to be rejected. 'able  7 (continued) 
Three—month  )k6> vs.  T..ele—month (k12)  expectations 
s(t,3) 
—  s(t)  d + as(t)  +  bs(t—3)  cs(t—ó) 
— s(t)  d + As(t)  + 
Bs(t—3) 
+ Cs(t—6) 
Consistency  Restrictions:  D(2+a)*d 
A)  )1+a)**2+b)-1 
3.)  1  +a)  *b+c 
C(  1+a)*c 
3 MONTH (OLS)  6 MONTH  (3MM)  H 
d  a  b  c  D  A  B  C  CHIS 
AVE  .0218  -.0009  .000'.  .0002  .0508  -.0019  .0006  .0008  570.1 
.0220)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0002>  (.0285)  (.0003>  .0002)  ) .0001)  .000 
BAN  .0201  -.9053  .0003  .0003  .0161  —.0019  .0009  .0007  326.1 
(.0255)  (.000'.)  (.0003)  (.0002)  (.0388)  (.000'.)  (.0003)  (.0002)  .000 
SEC  .0911  —.0024  .0011  .0005  .0988  —.0033  .0018  .0007  '.83.8 
(.0306)  (.0005)  (.0004)  (.0003)  (.0342)  (.0005)  (.0003)  (.0002)  .000 
TRA  .0105  -.0008  .0002  .0003  .131'.  —.0027  .0007  .0010  607.8 
(.0288)  (.0004)  (.000'.)  (.0003)  (.0392>  (.0005)  (.0003)  (.0002)  .000 
EXP  .0230  -.0006  .000'.  .0001  .0865  —.0018  .0004  .0008  211.9 
(.0249>  (.0004)  (.0003)  (.0002>  (.0300)  (.0003)  (.0002>  (.0002)  .000 
INS  —.0496  .0004  .0000  —.0003  —.0089  -.0005  -.0002  .0007  '.35.9 
(.0294)  )  .000'.)  (.000'.>  ) .0003)  ) .0260>  ) .0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  .000 
IMP  .0513  —.0013  .0009  —.0000  .0112  -.0015  .0003  .0009  153.0 
(.0391>  )  .0006)  (.0009)  (.0004>  (.0407)  (.0006>  (.0005)  (.0004)  .000 
FOR  -.0183  .0001  -.0000  -.0000  —.0344  .0002  -.0000  -.0000  18.6 
(.0036)  (.0001)  (.0000)  (.0000>  (.0050>  (.0001)  (.0000>  (.0000)  .000 
In Micro Data,  for only 2  individuals,  H is failed  to be rejected. 